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Determinants of Health Economic Decisions in Actual Practice: 
The Role of Behavioral Economics
This is a summary of the presentation given by Professor
Daniel Kahneman at the ISPOR 10th Annual Interna-
tional Meeting First Plenary Session, May 16, 2005,
Washington, DC, USA. Professor Kahneman is Eugene
Higgins Professor of Psychology and Professor of Public
Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton Uni-
versity, Princeton, NJ, USA.
Decision Utility versus Experience Utility
The concept of utility has had two quite different
meanings in its history. Originally, Jeremy Bentham [1]
introduced the concept of utility as the measure of pain
and pleasure as the sovereign masters that can govern
our conduct. This meaning of the term utility was used
through the 19th century. Around the beginning of the
20th century, the development of certain philosophies
of science known as positivism began. In psychology,
positivism took the form of behaviorism, and the con-
cept of utility as the experience of pain and pleasure
was discredited because experience is private and
therefore not amenable (so it was argued) to scientiﬁc
study. What was substituted was a concept of utility as
expressed in decisions. It is no longer what you expe-
rience or what you enjoy, it is what you want. Wants
are much more observable directly than enjoyment.
They are observable because choices are observable.
Utility became the degree to which one wants some-
thing. This concept has dominated economic and deci-
sion theory. Economists then derived from this concept
their view of well-being. For economists, well-being of
societies is measured by gross domestic product (GDP)
or GDP per capita. The theory is that the more choices
you have, the better off you are. If you have more
opportunities to choose, then you cannot be worse off.
Thus, to economists, income is a good proxy to the
number of choices you have. In that sense, GDP is a
measure of social welfare. Nevertheless, many people
(including economists) are dissatisﬁed with this con-
cept of utility. Now, there is a trend to return to the
“Jeremy Bentham” concept of utility.
Decision utility is what is studied when we observe
choices, and in the theoretical context, decision utili-
ties infer some choices and are used to explain choices.
Experienced utility is the utility that people experience.
It is what makes life in its various aspects good and
bad. In the early 20th century, when utility became
decision utility, the standard model of economics
assumed a rational agent. If a rational agent does what
is best for him/her, then the quality of the outcomes of
that agent does not have to be measured, because the
outcomes are as good as they could be. So if the agent
is a maximizing agent, and the wants of the agent are
known, there is no need to investigate whether the
agent enjoys the consequences of her choices. But
behavioral economists now believe that people are not
necessarily always rational and if people are not
rational, they do not  necessarily  always  choose  what
is  best  for  them.  And  in  that  case,  it  becomes useful
to measure consequences, independently of people’s
wants. So interest in the experienced utility grows.
Error in Quality-Adjusted Life-Year (QALY) 
Measurement
Quality-adjusted life-years are about decision utility.
They are inferred from choices and preferences that
people make, not from a study of actual experience.
The QALY assigns to each period of time, a weight,
ranging from zero to one, corresponding to the health-
related quality of life during that period, with one as
optimal health and zero equivalent to death. QALYs
are frequently obtained, not from the patients them-
selves, but from the public. QALYs are affective fore-
casts (i.e., forecasts of an experience that someone will
have under given conditions). Because affective fore-
casting is a task that people do not perform very well,
QALYs obtained from the public are also susceptible
to biases. In particular, QALYs obtained from patients
and the QALYs obtained from the public are going to
be radically different. This is because the public and
the patients have different reference points. For a time
trade-off or standard gamble exercise obtained from
the public, the perspective is that of a healthy person
considering  losing  his  health.  The  healthy  person is
in the situation of selling health. Patients confront a
choice between the same states, but in that case, as
buyers of health. Many experiments have shown that
buyers and sellers do not attach the same price to
goods, contrary to standard economic theory. The
effect is known as an endowment effect: people assign
a substantially higher price to any good when they sell
it than when they buy it, contrary to the standard the-
ory in which buying price and selling price only differ
by an income effect. A major difﬁculty with QALYs is
the difference between the patients and the public. The
difference is an error that the public makes in their
forecasting of patient utilities. A substitute or at least a
complement to QALYs and various related measures is
a direct measurement of people’s well-being.
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Well-Being
There are several ways of measuring people’s well-
being: retrospective global evaluations of life (people
are asked questions about their lives), experience sam-
pling (a sampling of activities  and  feeling  throughout
a day/week/or period of time). More recent methods
include the day reconstruction method [2], and there is
some promise of developments in the measurement of
brain correlates of positive emotional states [3].
What have we learned about well-being
(happiness)?
• Happiness has substantial physiological
correlates.
• Happiness is correlated with fewer illnesses and
faster healing (immune system functions better).
• Happiness correlates with speciﬁc measures in
brain  activity.  In  particular,  the  happy  side of
the brain (left side) is specialized in processing
approach (which includes both pleasure and
anger), whereas the unhappy right side is special-
ized in processing avoidance (things that make us
miserable or afraid).
• Happiness is primarily a personality trait. Individ-
ual differences account for about half of the var-
iance in experience sampling studies, and for
much more than half of the systematic variance.
• Life circumstances have small affects on well-
being. (For example, in a study of paraplegics and
lottery winners, paraplegics are less miserable
than almost anyone would have expected, but not
as happy as other people and lottery winners are
not particularly happy at all).
• Happiness changes in the course of the day,
depending on the activities in which people engage
and the people with whom they interact. The
effects of local circumstances are not quite as big
as the effects of individual differences, but they are
larger than the effects of general life circumstances
(e.g., income or age).
• Being with friends is a major source of happiness.
• Quality of sleep is also a signiﬁcant predictor of
the quality of emotional life.
The Hedonic Treadmill
To understand health states one needs to understand
the following phenomena. Although the standard of
living in the United States between 1946 and 1996
increased signiﬁcantly, people’s satisfaction with their
life and self-reported happiness remained about the
same. In Japan over the same period, although real
income increased ﬁvefold, satisfaction with life
remained constant. There are other surprises of this
kind. In particular, the effects of health, although sig-
niﬁcant, are in many cases surprisingly small. Like-
wise, the effects of age are small (the correlation is
positive, and r = 0.1), and the correlation of life satis-
faction with income within a society is also small
(0.15). Variables of life circumstance are not substan-
tially correlated with well-being. This phenomenon is
described as the hedonic treadmill: the image is that
people struggle to advance, but do not really get any-
where [4]. These are very powerful effects.
The hedonic treadmill is a phenomenon of adapta-
tion. There are many mechanisms that contribute to
adaptation. For example, paraplegics learn to achieve
their goals in different ways, but perhaps more impor-
tantly, they gradually begin to think of other things
than their handicap. A recent paraplegic may think
mostly about his tragic circumstances, but attention
ﬂows to novel events and is withdrawn from events
that have lost their novelty. The main cause of adap-
tation to stable circumstances is probably the with-
drawal of attention. Being a paraplegic is effectively a
part-time condition, because it does not affect experi-
ence very much when attention is drawn to other
aspects of life. And that is true for all stable states. You
think about it less, it affects your hedonic state for less
time and it affects your life satisfaction and reported
happiness less and less.
Failure of Affective Forecasting—The QALY
The exercise of affective forecasting in QALYs is the
wrong thought experiment. If you are not a paraplegic,
what you will do to assess that state is imagine what it
is like to become a paraplegic. Becoming a paraplegic
is more dramatic, it is an event, it is a change and it is
therefore easy to imagine. What is missed during the
thought experiment is adaptation, and the fact that the
paraplegic will mostly think of other things. It seems to
be virtually impossible to avoid that error.
The claim is that the task of determining QALYs is
essentially impossible to perform well. QALYs are not
a measure of the experience of the patient; they meas-
ure how much healthy people fear that particular con-
dition. Furthermore, the procedure elicits a measure of
the reluctance to sell health, which may not be the
appropriate reference point for assessing value.
Perhaps the answer is to measure the actual expe-
rience of patients. Nevertheless, this procedure will
also raise signiﬁcant ethical and normative problems,
especially because the ordering of the diseases may
change if there is differential adaptation. We know far
less about this way of measuring the impact of illness
than we do about QALYs. But we should acknowledge
that QALYs do not measure what we wish to measure.
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